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Abstract:    Many  philosophers  take  understanding  to  be  a  distinctive  kind  of  knowledge  
that  involves  grasping  dependency  relations;  moreover,  they  hold  it  to  be  particularly  
valuable.  This  paper  aims  to  investigate  and  address  two  well-­‐‑known  puzzles  that  arise  
from  this  conception:  (1)  the  nature  of  understanding  itself—in  particular,  the  nature  of  
“grasping”;  (2)  the  source  of  understanding’s  distinctive  value.  In  what  follows,  I’ll  argue  
that  we  can  shed  light  on  both  puzzles  by  recognizing  first,  the  importance  of  the  
distinction  between  the  act  of  coming  to  understand  and  the  state  of  understanding;  and  
second,  that  coming  to  understand  is  a  creative  act.  	  	  	  I.	  	  
Suppose   I   ask   you   how   to   get   to   Larissa,   and   you   give   me   the   right  
answer.   Suppose   further   your   answer   is   not   a   guess;   you   have   some  
grounds   for   it.   There   are   lots   of   different   ways   that   could   happen.   For  
example,  you  might:  
  
• Look  it  up  on  your  phone.    
• Remember  how  you  got  there  last  year.    
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• Do   both   of   these   things   but   also   explain   why   certain   routes   that  
look  good  on  the  map  are  actually  impossible  or  difficult  because  of  
the  geography  and  road  conditions.    
  
As  I  see  it,  all  three  of  these  actions  might  result  in  conditions  that  could  
ground   your   knowledge   of   how   to   get   to   Larissa.   Such   conditions  
represent   three   different   ways   our   opinions   can   be   grounded,   by   being  
based  on:    
  
• Reliable  sources.  
• Experience  or  reasons  that  we  possess.  
• A   grasp   of   the   causal   relations   between   local   conditions   and   the  
feasibility  of  local  travel  routes.      
  
If,   like   me,   you   are   tolerant   of   a   sensible   pluralism   about   knowledge,  
you’ll  be  comfortable  saying  that  these  different  kinds  of  grounding  give  
rise  to  different  kinds  of  knowing.1  The  first  sort  of  knowing  is  the  sort  we  
engage   in   when   we   absorb   information   from   expert   textbooks   or   good  
Internet   resources.   The   second   is   the   sort   of   knowing   that   occurs  
whenever   possessing   reasons   or   experience   matters.   And   the   third   is  
different   still—it   is   the   sort  of  knowing  we  expect   from  experts—even   if  
those   experts   are  more   intuitive   than  discursive   in   their   abilities.  This   is  
what  I’ll  call  understanding.  Understanding  in  this  sense  is  what  we  have  
when   we   know   not   only   the   “what”   but   the   “how”   or   the   “why.”2  
Understanding   is  what   the   scientist   is   after  when   trying   to   find   out   the  
root  causes  of  Ebola  outbreaks  (not  just  predict  how  the  disease  spreads).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ernest	  Sosa	  is	  the	  leading	  pluralist	  about	  knowledge	  in	  this	  sense.	  See	  Sosa,	  E.	  (2010).	  Knowing	  Full	  Well,	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  	  2	  Kvanvig,	  J.	  (2003).	  The	  Value	  of	  Knowledge	  and	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Understanding.	  Cambridge,	  UK,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Grimm,	  S.	  (2006).	  "Is	  Understanding	  a	  Species	  of	  Knowledge?"	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  57:	  515-­‐535.	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It   is  what   you   are   after  when   you  want   to   know  why   your   friend   is   so  
often  depressed  (as  opposed  to  knowing  that  she  is).3    
Many  philosophers   take  understanding   to  be  a  distinctive  kind  of  
knowledge   that   is   particularly   valuable.   The   kind   of   knowledge   in  
question   concerns   grasping   dependency   relations.   This   paper   aims   to  
investigate   and   address   two   well-­‐‑known   puzzles   that   arise   from   this  
conception.   The   first   concerns   the   nature   of   understanding   itself—in  
particular,  the  nature  of  the  “grasping”  relationship  that  understanding  is  
thought   to   involve.   The   second   concerns   the   source   of   understanding’s  
distinctive  value.  In  what  follows,  I’ll  argue  that  we  can  shed  light  on  both  
puzzles  by  recognizing  first,  the  importance  of  the  distinction  between  the  
act  of  coming  to  understand  and  the  state  of  understanding;  and  second,  
that  coming  to  understand  is  a  creative  act.  	  
II.    
  
“Understanding”,  like  “perceiving”,  displays  a  typical  state/act  ambiguity.  
Taken   in   the   first   sense,   it   refers   to   a   particular   kind   of   epistemically  
valuable   intentional   cognitive   state.4  While   the  details  differ,  most   views  
of  understanding  agree  on  certain  common  features  they  take  the  state  to  
have.  These  commonly  cited  properties  of  understanding  can  be  used   to  
help  fix  the  reference  of  the  “state”  use  of  the  term,  and  help  us  get  clear  
on  what  we  are  talking  about.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Philosophical  accounts  of  the  state  of  understanding  often  differ  over  whether  to  take  
understanding  as  a  form  of  knowledge  or  not.  This  is  an  important  difference,  although  
how  important  may  depend  on  one’s  account  of  knowledge;  pluralist  accounts,  like  the  
one  I  favor,  are  willing  to  take  “knowledge”  as  multiply  realizable.  While  I  will  continue  
to  take  understanding  as  a  form  of  knowledge  in  what  follows,  the  substantive  
contributions  of  this  paper  are  consistent  with  the  hold  that  the  concepts  are  more  
distinct.  For  discussion,  see  Zagzebski,  L.  (2001).  Recovering  Understanding.  Knowledge,  
Truth  and  Duty:  Essays  on  Epistemic  Justification,  Responsibility  and  Virtue.  M.  Steup.  
Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  Kvanvig,  J.  (2003).  The  Value  of  Knowledge  and  the  
Pursuit  of  Understanding.  Cambridge,  UK,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Grimm,  S.  
(2006).  "ʺIs  Understanding  a  Species  of  Knowledge?"ʺ  British  Journal  for  the  Philosophy  of  
Science  57:  515-­‐‑535.	  4	  The	  state	  I	  go	  on	  to	  describe	  is	  degree-­‐theoretic.	  One	  can	  understand	  more	  or	  less.	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First,   the   state   obviously   is   meant   to   be   capable   of   having   positive  
epistemic  status  —moreover,  it  can  convey  such  status  on  other  states.  The  
state  of  understanding  has  probative  force.    
Second,   it   is  directed  at  how  or  why   something   is   the   case.  Thus,  you  
understand  more  about  the  civil  rights  movement  if  you  understand  why  
and  how  it  came  about;  you  understand  string   theory   if  you  understand  
why  it  predicts  certain  events;  you  understand  a  person  to  the  extent  you  
don’t  just  know  that  she  is  unhappy,  but  what  makes  her  unhappy.    
We  can  take  it   that  what   is  common  between  understanding  how  and  
understanding  why   is   that  we  know  something  about   the  structure  of   the  
whole.  5  This  sounds  grand,  and  it  can  be,  as  when  we  understand  how  a  
proof   works   or   why   a   great   historical   event   occurred.   But   it   can   also  
happen  on  a  smaller  scale.  Consider,   for  example,   the   lucky  person  who  
understands   how   her   car  works.   She   has   this   understanding   in   part,   as  
we’ll  discuss  more  fully  in  a  moment,  because  she  has  certain  skills,  skills  
that  give  her  the  ability  to  see  how  various  parts  of  a  machine  depend  on  
one   another:   you   can’t   get   the   car   to  move  without   the   battery   and   the  
battery  won’t   be   charged  without   the   alternator.   You   understand  when  
you   see   not   just   the   isolated   bits,   but   how   those   bits   hang   together.  
Similarly   with   understanding   why   something   is   the   case.   When   we  
understand   why   something   is   the   case,   such   as   why   a   certain   disease  
spreads   or   why   your   friend   is   unhappy,   or   why   a   given   apple   tree  
produces  good  apples,  we  do   so  because  we  grasp  various   relationships.  
These   relationships   are   what   allow   us   to   see   the   difference   between  
possibilities,  between  one  hypothesis  and  another.    
If  so,  we  might  say  that  a  third  common  thought  about  understanding  
is   that   understanding   why   or   how   is   the   result   of   grasping   actual  
dependency   relations,   not   just   correlations.   An   instructive   example   is  
Plato’s  Euthyphronic  contrast:    
  
x  is  holy  when,  and  only  when,  x  is  loved  by  the  gods.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Grimm,	  S.	  (2006).	  "Is	  Understanding	  a	  Species	  of	  Knowledge?"	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  57:	  515-­‐535,	  Grimm,	  S.	  R.	  (2011).	  Understanding.	  The	  Routledge	  Companion	  to	  Epistemology.	  D.	  P.	  S.	  Berneker,	  Routledge.	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Instances  of  this  schema  will  be  universally  true.  They  might  be  true  in  all  
possible   worlds.   But   simply   grasping   the   instances   doesn’t   add   up   to  
understanding  why  what   is  holy   is   loved   the  gods,  or  how  holiness  and  
the  will  of   the  gods  are  metaphysically  situated   in   terms  of  one  another.    
Therefore,   it  doesn’t  add  up   to  understanding   the  nature  of  holiness.  To  
truly  understand,  you  also  need  to  know  what  depends  on  what.    
The  dependency  relations  we  grasp  when  we  understand  can  come  in  
different  forms.  Some  relations  might  be  about  cause  and  effect.  Think  of  a  
game  of  chess:  if  I  move  my  bishop  to  a  certain  square,  I  cause  it  to  change  
its   position.   But   they  might   also   be   logical:   if   I  move  my   bishop   to   this  
square,   it  will   be   vulnerable   to   your  pawn.  Or   semantic:   the   bishop   can  
move   to   that   square   because   the   rules   define   it   as   being   able   to   move  
diagonally  across  the  board.  In  other  words,  the  first  important  element  of  
understanding  a  game  like  chess  is  grasping  dependency  relations:  having  
systematic  knowledge  of  how  things  both  fit  together  and  depend  on  one  
another,   causally,   logically   and   otherwise. 6   Of   course,   knowledge   of  
certain   kinds   of   dependency   relations   might   be   particularly   relevant   to  
certain   kinds   of   understanding.   It   seems   plausible   that   scientific  
understanding,   for  example,  gives  pride  of  place   to  knowledge  of  causal  
relations.  
Understanding,   seen   as   stemming   from   the   grasp   of   dependency  
relations,   is   consistent   with,   if   it   does   not   entail,   holding   that  
understanding   can   be   directed   at   both   theories   and   persons.  
Understanding  a   theory,  on   this  view,  would   involve  understanding   the  
dependency   relationships   between   the   principles   and   theorems   that  
constitute  the  theory.  Likewise,  understanding  a  person  would  amount  to  
understanding   the   relationship   between   their   cognitive   and   emotional  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  is	  a	  broadly	  Aristotelian	  account	  of	  understanding.	  See	  Greco,	  J.	  (2014).	  Episteme:	  Knowledge	  and	  Understanding.	  Virtues	  and	  Their	  Vices.	  K.	  Timpe	  and	  C.	  Boyd.	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  285-­‐302.	  See	  also	  Grimm,	  S.	  (2006).	  "Is	  Understanding	  a	  Species	  of	  Knowledge?"	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  57:	  515-­‐535.	  (Not	  everyone	  sees	  understanding	  as	  involving	  knowledge.	  See	  Zagzebski,	  L.	  (2001).	  Recovering	  Understanding.	  Knowledge,	  Truth	  and	  Duty:	  Essays	  on	  Epistemic	  Justification,	  Responsibility	  and	  Virtue.	  M.	  Steup.	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.)	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states  and  their  behavior  in  certain  contexts.  In  this  sense,  understanding  a  
person  amounts  to  grasping  what  “makes  them  tick”  as  we  say.  7  
The   state   of   understanding   is   also   seen   as   being   related,   directly   or  
indirectly,  to  other  cognitive  states  and  an  agent’s  behavior.  Thus  the  idea  
that  understanding   is   the  grasping  of  dependency  relations  supports   the  
idea  that  understanding,  as  numerous  commentators  have  noted,  is  tied  to  
explanation.   On   some   views,   understanding   of   certain   kinds   involves	  having   the  grasp  of  a  correct  explanation,  or  at   least  having   the  potential  
for  such  a  grasp.8  But  even  if  one  does  not  take  the  (potential)  to  supply  a  
correct   explanation   as   a   necessary   condition   for   being   in   the   state   of  
understanding,   it   is   plausible,   at   the   very   least,   that   understanding   is  
conducive  of  good  explanations.9    
A  related  point  is  that  the  agent  who  understands  thereby  has  certain  
abilities.   The   Oracle   of   Delphi   supposedly   announced   that   no   one   was  
wiser  than  Socrates.  He  famously  replied  that  he  only  knew  that  he  knew  
very   little,   or   what   he   didn'ʹt   know.   So   what   sort   of   knowledge   did   he  
have?  Well,   consider  what  he  was   truly  good  at.  One   thing,   surely,  was  
asking  questions.  This  came  from  a  combination  of  knowing  facts  and  the  
ability  to  draw  connections  between  them.  As  a  result  he  had  know-­‐‑which,  
as  it  were.  He  knew  which  questions  to  ask.    
This   is   suggestive.   The   person  who   understands   is,   to   some   degree,  
discerning  not  only  the  actual  situation,  but  also  why  various  hypotheses  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  One	  complicating	  factor	  is	  whether,	  as	  Stephen	  Grimm	  has	  noted,	  one	  needs	  to	  also	  take	  a	  person’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  to	  be	  intelligible	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  her.	  Here,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  remember	  that	  understanding	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  I	  understand	  you	  to	  some	  degree	  if	  I	  understand	  why	  you	  do	  what	  you	  do.	  I	  understand	  you	  more	  if	  I	  understand	  why	  you	  do	  what	  you	  do	  and	  find	  your	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  intelligible.	  See	  Grimm,	  S.	  (2016).	  "How	  Understanding	  People	  Differs	  from	  Understanding	  the	  Natural	  World."	  Philosophical	  Issues	  
Forthcoming.	  8	  See	  Strevens,	  M.	  (2013).	  "No	  understanding	  without	  explanation."	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Part	  A	  44(3):	  510-­‐515.	  9	  Thus	  understanding	  need	  not	  be	  factive,	  although	  the	  deeper	  it	  becomes,	  the	  more	  it	  will	  approach	  factivity.	  To	  understand	  perfectly,	  perhaps,	  is	  factive	  (For	  further	  discussion	  see	  Elgin,	  C.	  (2009).	  Is	  Understanding	  Factive?	  Epistemic	  Value.	  A.	  Haddock,	  A.	  Millar	  and	  D.	  Pritchard.	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press:	  322-­‐330.	  See	  also	  Zagzebski,	  L.	  (2001).	  Recovering	  Understanding.	  Knowledge,	  Truth	  and	  Duty:	  Essays	  on	  Epistemic	  Justification,	  Responsibility	  and	  Virtue.	  M.	  Steup.	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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and   explanations  won’t  work   as  well   as   how   to   ask  what  would.10  They  
know   that   kicking   the   refrigerator   here   and   not   there   will   help   get   it  
working.   This   is   something   that   experts   in   general   can   do.   Indeed,  
experts—those   who   understand   a   given   subject   best—are   often   able   to  
increase  their  understanding  even  further  because  they  have  the  ability  to  
know  which  question  they  should  ask  in  the  face  of  new  information.  By  
so  doing,  they  can,  for  example,  reveal  that  Euthyphro  knows  nothing  of  
piety.  
Arguably,  however,  the  skill  of  being  able  to  ask  good  questions  itself  
hinges,  at  least  in  part,  on  a  simpler  (and  less  overtly  verbally  orientated)  
cognitive   capacity:   the   ability   to   make   inferences   and   draw   out   a  
position’s   consequences—and  not   just   the   actual   consequences  of,   say,   a  
given   position   on   what   causes   apples   to   be   tasty,   but   also   the  
consequences  of   that  position   in  certain  counterfactual   situations.  This   is  
precisely  the  skill  that  a  good  doctor  employs  when  considering  whether  
to  administer  a  drug,  or  a  lawyer  uses  when  considering  an  argument.  It  is  
also,   arguably,   the   skill   a   good   mechanic   employs   when   considering  
whether   to   disassemble   a   head   gasket,   or   an   apple   farmer   uses   when  
deciding  whether   another   farmer’s   advice   is   reasonable.  And   those  who  
have   the   capacity   to   cognitively   engage,   should   they   have   the   requisite  
verbal  and  linguistic  abilities,  will  know  which  questions  they  should  ask  
in  order  to  carry  their  inquiries  even  further.    
This   list  of  commonly  cited  characteristics  of  understanding  is  hardly  
exhaustive.  But  it  can  be  use  to  give  a  partial  functional  characterization  of  
the   state   of   understanding.   Even   a   partial   functionalist   characterization  
can  be  used  to  fix  the  reference  of  the  term.  One  suggestion  might  be  this:    
  
U:  A  state  of  some  agent  plays  the  understanding-­‐‑role  with  regard  to  
some  subject  when  its  content  concerns  dependency  relations  between  
propositions  or  states  of  affairs  relevant  to  the  subject;   it   is  conducive  
of   the   agent’s   ability   to   offer   justified   explanations   of   the   relevant  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Again,	  see	  Strevens,	  M.	  (2013).	  "No	  understanding	  without	  explanation."	  Studies	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Part	  A	  44(3):	  510-­‐515.	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subject;11  and  it  disposes  the  agent  to  make  further  justified  inferences  
both  factual  and  counterfactual  about  the  subject.  
  
Such   a   state   would   presumably   have   positive   epistemic   status   and  
probative  force.    
Like   any   functional   description,   this   one   still   leaves   much   to   be  
said.   In  particular,   it   leaves  open   the  underlying  psychological  nature  of  
the  state  or  states  that  can  play  the  role,  and  the  value  those  states  may  or  
may  not  have  when  playing  that  role.  Moreover,  as  we  shall  see,  there  is  
more   to   be   said   about   the   etiology   of   understanding—the   distinctive  
causal  antecedents  of  states  playing  the  understanding-­‐‑role.    	  	  III.	  	  	  
So   what   is   the   state   that   plays   the   u-­‐‑role?   A   natural   suggestion,   given  
what   we’ve   said   so   far,   might   be   a   distinctive   cognitive   attitude   we’ve  
called   “grasping”.   While   I   think   this   suggestion   is   intuitive,   and   has  
something  to  be  said  for  it,  I  don’t  think  it  is  productive,  for  two  reasons.    
First,   and   as   Stephen   Grimm   has   noted,   the   psychology   of   such  
relations  is  difficult  to  parse—especially  when  we  take  it  as  constitutive  of  
a  stable  state.12    
One  reason  for  that  is  that  the  root  metaphor  at  work  in  “grasping”  is  
obviously  active.  Grasping  is  something  we  do,  and  insofar  as  we  think  of  
it  has  having  a  distinct  phenomenological   character,   it   is  a   cognitive  act,  
available   to   conscious   attention.   In   contrast,   understanding,   taken   as   a  
state  of  mind,   seems   (like  belief)  dispositional.   Just  as  one  might  be   in  a  
state   of   decision   (or   indecision,   as   the   case   may   be)   without   doing  
anything  in  particular,  or  even  being  conscious  of  being  in  that  state,  we  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  clause	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  neutral	  with	  regard	  whether	  the	  agent	  has	  such	  an	  ability	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  If	  they	  do	  have	  such	  ability,	  the	  state	  playing	  the	  understanding-­‐role	  will	  be	  conducive	  of	  that	  agent	  manifesting	  it.	  Children,	  for	  example,	  might	  lack	  that	  ability	  in	  certain	  contexts	  while	  still	  possessing	  some	  understanding.	  Thanks	  for	  Stephen	  Grimm	  for	  discussion.	  	  12	  Grimm,  S.  R.  (2011).  Understanding.  The  Routledge  Companion  to  Epistemology.  D.  P.  
S.  Berneker,  Routledge.	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can   understand   why   something   is   the   case   without   being   consciously  
aware   of   that   fact,   and   without   the   understanding   being   available   for  
conscious  attention.  Your  understanding  in  such  a  case  is  tacit  or  implicit.  
Arguably,  much  of  what  we  understand  we  understand  in  this  way,  and  
we  can  forget  that  we  understand  something  that  we  do  understand.    
As   noted   above,   understanding   is   also   thought   to   have   distinctive  
value.  A  second  problem  with  the  suggestion  that  grasping  is  what  plays  
the  u-­‐‑role,  is  that  it  doesn’t  particularly  help  answer  this  question.    
One  might  think  at  first  that  the  reverse  is  the  case.  The  thought  would  
be  that  understanding  is  valuable  because  grasping  dependency  relations  
is   valuable.   That   seems   true,   but   it   doesn’t   say   what   is   distinctively  
valuable   about   understanding.   If   cognitive   contact   with   dependency  
relations   is   valuable,   then   it   seems   possible   that   we   might   have  
epistemically  positive  cognitive  contact  with  such  relations  in  other  ways.  
That  is,  we  might  know  about  the  relations  without  understanding  them.  
If   so,   what   constitutes   the   distinctive   value   of   the   grasping   of   those  
relations?  One  tactic  is  to  argue  that  the  value  of  grasping  rests  in  the  fact  
that  understanding  is  “active”  and  not  passive:  as  a  result  understanding,  
unlike   other   epistemic   states,   is   a   cognitive   achievement. 13 That   is  
plausible.   But   it   raises   some   questions   all   on   its   own.14  First,   we   might  
wonder  what   type   of   achievement   understanding   is.   Second,   if   being   in  
the  state  of  understanding  is  an  achievement,  then  being  in  that  state  must  
itself   be   the   result   of   an   act—the   act   of   achieving   understanding.   And  
generally,  when  we   talk  about  achievements,  we   think   that  part  of  what  
makes   the   achievement   admirable   is   that   the   agent   voluntarily   did  
something  to  achieve  the  goal.  Achievements  are  partly  valuable  because,  
well,  they  were…achieved.    
In  sum,  I  think  that  it  is  implausible  that  grasping  is  what  plays  the  u-­‐‑
role.   On   the   one   hand,   it   seems   to   overcomplicate   matters:   it   posits   an  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  Pritchard,	  D.	  (2008).	  "Knowing	  the	  Answer,	  Understanding	  and	  Epistemic	  Value."	  Grazer	  Philosophische	  Studien	  77:	  325-­‐339.	  14	  Similar  problems  arise  with  the  possibility  that  understanding  is  valuable  because  
knowledge  is  valuable,  and  understanding  either  is  a  type  of  knowledge  or  leads  to  
knowledge.  That  just  seems  less  than  illuminating,  since  it  doesn’t  actually  tell  us  what  is  
distinctively  valuable  about  understanding  itself  and/or  makes  that  value  instrumental  to  
another.	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active   process   to   play   the   role   of   what   is   plausibly   a   dispositional   or  
implicit   state.   Second,   it   under-­‐‑explains:   it   doesn’t   by   itself,   at   least,  
explain   why   understanding   is   held   to   have   distinctive   value   over   and  
above  other  kinds  of  knowledge.  
That  said,  I  think  it  clear  that  grasping  should  figure  in  any  account  of  
what  understanding  is.  The  question  is  where.    
  I   suggest   we   can  make   a   promising   start   on   this   project   by   paying  
attention   to   the   other   half   of   the   “understanding”   state/act   ambiguity.  
More  precisely,  I  think  it  is  worth  thinking  about  the  process  of  coming  to  
understand.   This   should   shed   light   on   understanding   (the   state)   itself.  
That’s   because   like   other   kinds   of   mental   states,   the   state’s   etiology,   or  
typical  causal  antecedents,  help  to  pick  out  its  functional  role.  Think  of  the  
state  of  believing  that  certain  things  are  in  your  visual  field.    Being  in  that  
state   is   the   causal   result   of   having   visual   experience.   Likewise,   to  
understand  one  must  first  come  to  understand.  My  hypothesis   is   that  an  
analyses  of  the  cognitive  act  of  coming  to  understand  can  help  shed  light  
on  why  we  are  tempted  to  say  that  understanding  (the  state)  is  a  cognitive  
achievement,  and  why  it  involves  an  activity  like  grasping.    
In  the  view  we’ll  entertain  here,  grasping  is  constitutive  not  so  much  of  
the   state   of   understanding,   but   of   the   causally   prior   act   of   coming   to  
understand;  moreover,  this  prior  act  is  partly  definitive  of  the  state  it  produces.    
If   this   is   right,   then   the   state   of   understanding   is   distinctive   in   part  
because   of   its   etiology;   one   comes   to   be   in   that   state   only   in   virtue   of  
having  been  caused  to  do  so  by  first  engaging  in  an  active  psychological  
process  which  is  available  to  conscious  attention.15  But  what  is  it  to  come  
to  understand?    
Coming  to  understand  is  a  mental  act  in  the  same  way  that  reflecting  
or  deciding  are  mental  acts.  They  are  activities  that  your  mind  engages  in.  
They  take  effort  and  increase  the  total  cognitive  load.  A  full  description  of  
the   act   of   grasping   is   of   course   the   job   of   empirical   psychology   and  
cognitive   science;   but   prior   theoretical   reflection   sharpens,   here   as  
elsewhere,   our   empirical   inquiries.   The   sharpening   I   suggest   is   this:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Something	  can	  be	  available	  to	  conscious	  attention	  without,	  at	  that	  moment,	  being	  attended	  to.	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coming  to  understand,  and  therefore  the  grasping  that  helps  to  constitute  
it,  is  a  creative  act.    
     In  order  to  begin  to  see  why  this  is  plausible,  and  how  it  sheds  light  
on   understanding   itself   and   its   value,   consider   a   (probably   apocryphal)  
story  about  Descartes.  Descartes  was  a  late  riser.  His  habit,  when  possible,  
was   to   stay   in   bed   till   around   noon—musing.   One   day,   according   to  
legend,   he   was   watching   a   fly   zoom   around   above   his   head   when,  
suddenly,   he   realized   that   he   could   track   its   position   by   measuring   its  
distance   from   the  walls   and   the   ceiling.   He   understood   how   to   plot   its  
flight  path  in  space  .  .  .  and  voilà!  We  get  Cartesian  coordinates,  or  so  the  
story  goes.    
   The  story  of  Descartes’  fly—and  others  like  it,  such  as  those  about  
Newton’s   apple   or   Einstein’s   clock—are   instructive   because   they  
emphasize  that  the  moment  of  coming  to  understand  can  involve  sudden  
insight.   Such   moments   are   often   called   “aha   moments”   and,   in   the  
psychological   literature,   are   collectively   taken   to   signify   the   “Eureka  
effect”  (so  named  after  Archimedes,  who  after  a  moment  of  great  insight  
shouted  “Eureka!”).  Of  course,  most  acts  of  understanding  do  not  require  
the   sudden   novel   inspiration   that   Descartes   had.   But   all   of   them   do  
involve   some   level   of   insight.   Having   such   an   insight   is   part   of   why  
understanding  is  fundamentally  a  creative  act.      
   Creativity,   or   creative   acts,   are   complex.   They   are   marked   by  
having  a  combination  of  characteristics,  characteristics  that  other  acts  can  
have  but  which  taken  together  help  to  distinguish  creative  acts  from  other  
things  humans  do.  One   subset  of   creative  acts—a  particularly   important  
subset—are  creative  mental  or  psychological  acts.  It  is  their  characteristics  
I  discuss  here.    
First,  creative  mental  acts  are  new  or  novel.  As  Margaret  Boden  as  
famously   emphasized,   creative   ideas   needn’t   be   historically   novel—like  
Descartes’   new   geometrical   ideas—but   they   are   psychologically   novel   or  
novel  to  the  creator.16  Thus,  being  creative  isn’t  the  same  as  being  original.  
People  can  have  ideas  that  are  creative  for  them.  As  Boden  says,  “Suppose  
a   twelve-­‐‑year-­‐‑old   girl,  who’d  never   read  Macbeth,   compared   the  healing  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Boden,	  M.	  A.	  (2004).	  The	  Creative	  Mind:	  Myths	  and	  Mechanisms,	  Routledge.	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power   of   sleep   with   someone   knitting   up   a   raveled   sleeve.  Would   you  
refuse  to  say  she  was  creative,  just  because  the  Bard  said  it  first?”17  I  don’t  
think  so,  and  neither  does  Boden.  Creativity  is  relative  to  a  person.    
   Second,   creative   mental   acts   are   generative   of   valuable,   not   just  
psychologically   novel   ideas.   Creative   ideas   are   valuable   to   the   person’s  
cognitive  workspace.  They  move   things   forward  on   the   conceptual   field  
on  which   they   are   currently   playing.   They   are   useful   and   fecund.   They  
have  progeny,  and  they  contribute  to  the  problems  at  hand.    
Third,  creative  mental  acts  are   typically   the  result  of   the  cognitive  
effort  distinctive  of  synthetic  imagination.  The  psychological  act  involved  
in  composing  a  song  requires  the  ability  to  put  together  a  complex  string  
of   different   ideas   about   harmony,   melody   and   rhythm;   the   process   of  
creating   a   coherent   and   believable   fictional   character   likewise   involves  
psychologically  combining   ideas  of  personality  and  physical  description.  
This  is  we  think  that  creative  mental  acts  often  put  things  together  in  new  
ways.    
So   far,   coming   to   understand   seems   to   fit   this   model   of   creative  
psychological   acts:   it   involves   generating   in   a   synthetically   imaginative  
way   new   and   valuable   ideas.   Which   ideas?   Those   that   concern  
dependency   relationships—how   things   fit   together.   The   “grasping”   of  
those   relationships,   which   lies   at   the   heart   of   understanding,   is   what  
makes   understanding   creative.   This   is   most   obvious   in   paradigmatic,  
historic  cases  of  new  understanding,  like  Descartes’  insight  into  how  point  
location  in  Euclidean  space  can  be  plotted  algebraically  or  Einstein’s  flash  
of   understanding   relativity   upon   seeing   a   clock.   But   what   about   less  
historically   original   acts   of   understanding?   Consider   again   a   child   who  
comes  to  understand,  for   the  first   time,  why  0.150   is  smaller   than  0.5.  At  
that   moment,   the   child   is   also   having   an   insight—a   realization   of   how  
things   are   related.   Or   consider   again   our   student   above,   coming   to  
understand  for  the  first  time  why  Lady  Macbeth  sees  blood  on  her  hands,  
or  why  sailing  is  more  pleasant  and  efficient  when  the  wind  is  not  behind  
you.  Each  of   these  acts  of  coming  to  understand  are  creative   insights   for  
the  person  in  question,  even  though  they  are  in  no  way  novel.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.,	  at	  2.	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  The  three  characteristics  of  creative  mental  acts  we’ve  canvassed  so  
far  are  not  exhaustive;   there   is  a   fourth—one  emphasized  by  Boden  and  
more   recently   by   Nanay. 18   Creative   mental   acts   have   a   distinctive  
phenomenological   feel.   The   phenomenology   in   question   might   be  
described   as   something   akin   to   surprise.   Boden   calls   this   their  
“impossible”  aspect—that  is,  an  idea  is  creative  for  a  person  when  she  has  
a  felt  sense  that  the  idea  could  not  have  been  had  prior  to  the  moment  of  
creation.  Conditions  were  right,  and  the  person  suddenly  “sees.”         
It  seems  clear  that  the  act  of  grasping/coming  to  understand  shares  
this   characteristic   as  well.   Indeed,   it   is   particularly   striking   in   this   case.  
Coming  to  understand  has  a  particular  phenomenological  appearance.  In  
cases  of  sudden  insight,  this  phenomenological  aspect  of  creativity  either  
constitutes,   or   leads   to,   the   “eureka”   feeling.   But   creative   acts   can   be  
surprising   even   if   they   do   not   necessarily   provoke   that   “aha”  moment.  
Consider   coming   to   slowly   understand,   for   example,   why   a   particular  
theorem  followed   from  a  particular   set  of  premises—you  understood,  as  
we   say,   the  proof.  Even  when   coming   to  understand  happens  gradually  
over  time  it  still  feels  “new”  –  as  if  you  couldn’t  have  understood  it  prior  
to  that  moment.  It  feels  as  if  you’ve  made  forward  progress.  That’s  why  it  
makes   sense   to   say   that   the   act   of   coming   to   understand   is   also  
surprising—again,   not   necessarily   in   the   “eureka”   sense—because   the  
person  who  comes  to  understand  feels  as  if  they  could  not,  relative  to  their  
past   evidence   and   cognitive   context,   have   understood   it   before   that  
moment.    
It  might  be  thought  that  not  all  acts  of  coming  to  understand  can  be  
creative  in  this  sense.  Surely,  one  might  think,  coming  to  understand  the  
simple  logical  entailments  of  what  else  I  understand  cannot  be  a  creative.  
In   many   cases,   those   entailments,   and   seeing   why   they   follow,   is   too  
trivial  to  count  as  truly  creative.    
In   some   cases,   coming   to   know  what   follows   from   a   proposition  
you  understand,  and  why  it   follows,   is  not  at  all   trivial.   It   requires  great  
effort   and   insight.   In   those   cases   you   do   come   to   understand   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Nanay,	  B.	  (2014).	  An	  experiential	  account	  of	  creativity.	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Creativity.	  E.	  Paul	  and	  S.	  B.	  Kaufman,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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entailment.   But   in   other   cases   such   knowledge  may  well   be   trivial,   and  
nothing   in   the   account   rules   that   out.   That’s   because   coming   to   know   a  
given  entailment  may  not  be  an  act  of  coming  to  understand.  Understanding  
is  a  matter  of  degree,  and  our  account  of  the  state  implies  that  the  greater  
one   understands,   the   more   one   is   able   to   draw   the   relevant   inferences.  
Part   of   drawing   the   relevant   inferences   is   knowing   why   certain  
entailments  hold  from  what  you  do  understand.  Thus,  if  one  understands    
<p>  to  a  sufficient  degree  one  will,  just  by  virtue  of  being  in  that  state,  know  
why   certain   entailments   hold.   That’s   consistent   with   saying   that   while  
coming  to  understand  <p>  might  be  creative,  one  doesn’t  separately  come  
to  understand  (in  the  target  sense)  <q>.  That’s  because  if  one  understands  
<p>   sufficiently,   one   is   by   virtue   of   that   fact   already   disposed   to   know  
both  <if  p  then  q>    and  <q>.19    
Some  might  protest  that  this  account  of  creative  mental  acts   is  too  
permissive.  According   to   this   line  of   thought,  originating  a  new  proof   is  
creative.  You  are  the  first  person  that  comes  up  with  it.  But  simply  coming  
to  understand  why  the  proof  works  isn’t  creative.    
This   objection   confuses  ways   something   can   be   creative.   A   novel  
discovery  or  origination  of  a  new  proof  is  undoubtedly  creative.  Call  this  
special   type  of  creativity,  which   is  very  rare,  o-­‐‑creativity   (for  “original”).  
But  as  I  pointed  out  above,  not  all  creative  acts  are  o-­‐‑creative.  (Consider,  
for  example,  the  fact  that  someone  might  originate  or  discover  a  proof,  the  
proof   be   forgotten   for   a   thousand   years,   and   then   someone   else   might  
originate   or  discover   it   again).   Thus  your   act   of   first   originating   a  proof  
might   be   o-­‐‑creative,   but   my   act   of   coming   to   understand   it   for   myself  
might  be  creative  for  me.  And  that’s  creativity  enough.    
Finally,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that  the  surprising  or  “impossible”  
aspect  of  creativity  makes  creating  seem  at  once  something  we  do  (which  
it  is)  and  at  the  same  time  something  happening  to  us.  The  muse  suddenly  
strikes.  Realization  comes  in  a  flash.  Coming  to  understand  is  like  this  as  
well.  It  involves  insight,  and  insight,  as  the  very  word  suggests,  is  like  the  
voluntary  opening  of  a  door,  a  “disclosing,”  as  Heidegger  said.  One  acts  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	  addition,	  it	  bears	  noting	  that	  even	  if	  one  understands  <p>,  knows  <if  p,  then  q>,  and  
on  that  basis,  comes  to  know  <q>.  That  fact  alone  doesn’t  mean  you  come  to  understand  
<q>  since  you  may  not  understand  <if  p,  then  q>.	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by   opening   the   door,   and   then   one   is   acted   upon   by   seeing   what   lies  
beyond.    
  
  	  	  IV.	  	  	  
We  can  summarize  the  hypotheses  floated  in  the  last  section  as  follows:  To  
understand   requires   first   coming   to   understand.   And   coming   to  
understand   involves   actively   grasping   certain   dependency   relations,  
where  grasping  is  a  conative  state  of  mind  (both  directed  and  active)  with  
features   associated   with   a   creative   mental   act.   In   particular,   the   act   of  
coming  to  understand/grasping  is  creative  for  a  person  to  the  extent  that  it  
generates  ideas  that  are,  for  that  person:    
• Novel  
• Valuable  
• The  result  of  synthetic  imagination  
• Have   a   distinctive   phenomenology:   their   “surprising”   or  
“impossible”  aspect.    
Obviously,   this   description   of   the   mental   act   of   coming   to  
understand/grasping   doesn’t   tell   us   everything   about   its   nature.   But   it  
does  help  us  see  what  is  distinctive  and  special  about  the  act  of  grasping,  
and   as   a   result,   can  help   to   guide   further   investigation.  When  we   “look  
for”   grasping   in   our   psychological   theorizing   and   experimentation,   the  
present   suggestion   is   that   we   look   for   a   mental   act   with   these  
characteristics.    
The  above  suggestion  also  allows  us  to  adopt  a  more  straightforward  
answer  to  the  question  of  what  occupies  the  u-­‐‑role—that  is,  what  kind  of  
mental   state   is   at   play  when  we   are   in   the   state   of   understanding.   The  
straightforward  answer  is  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  belief  whose  properties  
(both  epistemic  and  psychological)  allow  it  to  play  the  understanding  role.  
To   understand   is   to   believe   in   a   certain   way.   But   part   of   what   it   is   to  
believe  in  that  way  is  to  arrive  at  the  belief  in  a  distinctive  manner,  to  come  
to  understand  by  grasping   the  relevant  dependency  relations.   If   so,   then  
we  can  revise  our  functional  analysis  as  follows:    
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U*:  A  belief  (of  some  agent)  plays  the  understanding-­‐‑role  with  regard  
to  some  subject  when  the  agent  has  been  caused  to  be  in  that  state  by  
grasping   dependency   relations   between   propositions   or   states   of  
affairs   relevant   to   the   subject;   the   ensuing   belief   is   about   those  
relations;  having   the  belief   is   conducive  of   the  agent’s  ability   to  offer  
justified  explanations  of  the  relevant  subject;  and  it  disposes  the  agent  
to   make   further   justified   inferences   both   factual   and   counterfactual  
about  the  subject.  
  
The   above   analysis   is   consistent,   of   course,   with   some   kind   of  
psychological   state   other   than   belief   playing   the   understanding   role   in  
some  agents.  But  it  seems  likely  that   it   is  a  kind  of  belief  that  most  often  
realizes  the  role  in  human  beings.    
   I   began   by   suggesting   that   a   focus   on   the   act   of   coming   to  
understand   can   light   on   two   puzzles   about   understanding.   The   first  
puzzle  was  metaphysical,   and   concerned   its   nature.   The   above   analyses  
provides  an  overall   lesson.  Like  many  other   targets  of  psychological  and  
epistemic  analysis,  understanding  is  distinguished  by  (1)  how  we  come  be  
in   the   state;   (2)   its  properties  and  content;   (3)   its   effects  on  our  behavior  
and  dispositions   to   behave.  Nonetheless,   understanding   is   still   a   deeply  
interesting  and  important  state  of  mind,  one  that  our  analysis  predicts  as  
requiring  cognitive  effort  to  achieve,  the  result  of  the  act  of  grasping  how  
things  hang  together.  
The   second  puzzle  about  understanding  our   suggestion  may  help  
to  solve  concerns  its  value.  But  before  dealing  with  this  question  directly,  
it   is   illuminating   to   look   at   another   longstanding   issue   about  
understanding:    its  relation  to  testimony.    
Understanding   is   often   said   to   be   different   from   other   forms   of  
knowledge  precisely  because  it  is  not  directly  conveyed  by  testimony—and  
thus  not  directly  teachable.20  The  thought  is  that  you  can  give  someone  the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Zagzebski,	  L.	  (1999).	  What	  Is	  Knowledge?	  The	  Blackwell	  Guide	  to	  Epistemology.	  J.	  Greco	  and	  E.	  Sosa,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  Zagzebski,	  L.	  (2001).	  Recovering	  Understanding.	  Knowledge,	  Truth	  and	  Duty:	  Essays	  on	  Epistemic	  Justification,	  Responsibility	  and	  Virtue.	  M.	  Steup.	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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basis  for  understanding  via  testimony,  including  the  knowledge  that  they  
must  have  in  order  to  achieve  that  understanding.  But  in  the  usual  cases,  
you  can’t  directly  convey  the  understanding  itself.    
The  question  is  why  this  should  be.  What  is  it  about  understanding  
that  makes  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  convey  via  testimony?  The  present  
suggestion   supplies   an   answer:   in   order   to   first   understand,   one   must  
come  to  understand.  And  coming  to  understand  is  a  creative  act.  As  such,  
it   requires  a  cognitive,  generative  psychological  action  on  the  part  of   the  
agent   over   and   above   whatever   knowledge   might   be   conveyed   by  
another.  An   art   teacher,   for   example,   can   give  me   the   basis   for   creative  
thought  by  teaching  me  the  rudiments  of  painting.  She  can  give  me  ideas  
of  what   to   paint   and   how   to   paint   it.   But   I   did   not   create   these   ideas;   I  
create  when  I  move  beyond  imitating  to  interpret  these  ideas  in  my  own  
way.   Likewise,   you   can   give   me   a   theorem   without   my   understanding  
why   it   is   true.   And   if   I   do   come   to   understand  why   it   is   true,   I   do   so  
because   I’ve   expended   some   effort—I’ve   drawn   the   right   logical  
connections.   Coming   to   understand   is   something   you   must   do   for  
yourself.  
Let’s  contrast  this  with  other  kinds  of  knowledge.  I  can  download  
ordinary  factual  knowledge  directly  from  you.  You  tell  me  that  whales  are  
mammals;  I  believe  it,  and  if  you  are  a  reliable  source  and  the  proposition  
in   question   is   true,   I   know   in   the   receptive   way.   No   effort   needed.   Or  
consider  responsible  belief:  you  give  me  some  evidence  for  whales  being  
mammals.  You  tell  me  that  leading  scientists  believe  it.  If  the  evidence  is  
good,  then  if  I  believe  it,  I’m  doing  so  responsibly.  But  in  neither  case  do  I  
thereby  directly  understand  why  whales  are  or  aren’t  mammals.  You  can,  
of   course,   give   me   the   explanation   (assuming   you   have   it).   But   to  
understand   it,   I   must   first   grasp   it   myself.   Understanding   can’t   be  
outsourced.    
Earlier  we   noted   that  while   it   is   intuitive   that   understanding   has  
distinctive,   perhaps   intrinsic,   value,   it   is   unclear   what   the   basis   of   that  
value   happens   to   be.      Our   reflections   on   why   understanding   isn’t  
conveyed   by   testimony   rely   on   the   fact   that   understanding   is   partly  
defined   by   its   etiology;   to   be   in   the   state,   one   must   first   come   to  
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understand.   This   same   fact   helps   to   explain   the   distinctive   value   of  
understanding  as  well.    
Earlier   we   noted   that   we   typically   take   understanding   to   be   a  
cognitive  achievement,  and  that  fact  is  part  of  the  explanation  for  why  we  
think   it   is   valuable.   But   seeing   understanding   as   an   achievement,   we  
noted,  means  that  the  state  must  be  something  we  do  out  of  an  act  of  will.  
It  has  to  be,  as  it  were,  achieved.  The  present  account  dovetails  with,  and  
explains,   this   fact.   We   achieve   understanding   because   we   first   come   to  
understand—an  act  that  requires  effort.    
Moreover,   coming   to   understand   is   a   creative   act.      And   the  
creativity   of   that   act   helps   to   explain   our   intuitive   sense   that  
understanding  is  a  cognitive  state  of  supreme  value  and  importance,  not  
just  for  where  it  gets  us  but  in  itself.  Creativity  matters  to  human  beings.  
That’s  partly  because   the  creative  problem-­‐‑solver   is  more  apt   to  survive,  
or   at   least   to   get   what   she   wants.   But   we   also   value   it   as   an   end.   It   is  
something  we   care   about   for   its   own   sake.  And   that   goes   for   coming   to  
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